Could the residents resist eviction from government land through a shelter claim under Article 15 or their pleaded rights under Articles 27, 31 and 32, and did the challenged notices comply with section 5(1) of the 1970 Ordinance?
Legal record
- Court
- High Court Division
- Decision date
- 8 July 2025
- Citation
- 20 SCOB [2025] HCD 171
- Case number
- Writ Petition No. 5608 of 2017
Further record & version details
- Disposition
- Rule discharged; earlier stay vacated; judgment and order to be communicated at once (paragraphs 26–28).
The supplied decision
Bench, parties & source notes
- Bench / judges
- Md. Rezaul Hasan J and Biswajit Debnath J; judgment delivered by Md. Rezaul Hasan J
- Parties
- Petitioners: Ain-O-Salish Kendra (ASK), represented by its Executive Director, and others. Respondents: Bangladesh, represented by its Secretary, Ministry of Housing and Public Works, and others.
- Counsel / appearances
- Mr.Md. Anisul Hassan with Mr. Abdullah Al Mahmud, Mr. Mohammad Sayeed Abrar, Mr. Md. Ahsan Ullah, Mr. Hossain Mohammad Shahidul and Mr. Md. Salequzzaman, Advocates. ......…. For the Petitioners. Mr. Hasibul Huq, Advocate. .....For the respondent No.2. Mr. Mohammad Arshadur Rouf, Additional Attorney General with Mr. Syed Ejaz Kabir, DAG with Mr. Waliul Islam Oli, DAG and Mr. Md. Abdul Jabbar Joel, AAG Mr. Md. Esa, A.A.G Mrs. Rafiza Alam Lucky, A.A.G. Mr. Md. Joynal Hussain, A.A.G., Mrs. Mahbuba Tasnim Akhi, AAG ……. For other Respondents.
Source & text context
Read the full judgment in PDFOpen the supplied document (opens in a new tab)Read the source
Judgment text
20 SCOB [2025] HCD
HIGH COURT DIVISION (SPECIAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION)
Present: Mr. Justice Md. Rezaul Hasan And Mr. Justice Biswajit Debnath.
WRIT PETITION NO. 5608 OF 2017.
Ain-O-Salish Kendra (ASK), represented by its Executive Director, 7/17, Block-B, Lalmatia, Dhaka and others. ……Petitioners.
-Versus-
Bangladesh, represented by its Secretary, Ministry of Housing and Public Works, Bangladesh Secretariat, Dhaka, and others. ………….… Respondents.
Mr.Md. Anisul Hassan with Mr. Abdullah Al Mahmud, Mr. Mohammad Sayeed Abrar, Mr. Md. Ahsan Ullah, Mr. Hossain Mohammad Shahidul and Mr. Md. Salequzzaman, Advocates. ………. For the Petitioners.
Mr. Hasibul Huq, Advocate. …..For the respondent No.2.
Mr. Mohammad Arshadur Rouf, Additional Attorney General with Mr. Syed Ejaz Kabir, DAG with Mr. Waliul Islam Oli, DAG and Mr. Md. Abdul Jabbar Joel, AAG Mr. Md. Esa, A.A.G Mrs. Rafiza Alam Lucky, A.A.G. Mr. Md. Joynal Hussain, A.A.G., Mrs. Mahbuba Tasnim Akhi, AAG ……. For other Respondents.
Date of Hearing: 02-07-2025
Date of Judgment: 08-07-2025.
Editors’ Note:
In the instant writ petition, Ain o Salish Kendra (ASK), acting as a public interest litigant, together with three individual residents of the Shyamoli Road No. 2 slum, impugned eviction notices dated 09.04.2017 issued under section 5(1) of the Government and Local Authority Lands and Buildings (Recovery of Possession) Ordinance, 1970. The petitioners alleged that the notices were arbitrary and violative of Articles 27, 31 and 32 of the Constitution. The respondents contended that the land in question had long since been allotted for the construction of government offices, that possession had been duly handed over to the authorities concerned, and that the petitioners were unauthorized occupants. It was further asserted that the impugned notices strictly complied with the minimum notice requirements under the Ordinance.
Upon consideration, the Court held that the claimed “right to shelter” is traceable to Article 15 of the Constitution, which forms part of the Fundamental Principles of State Policy and is therefore non-justiciable and not enforceable through writ jurisdiction. The notices in question were lawfully issued under section 5(1) of the Ordinance, and no unlawful occupation can mature into a vested right or a legitimate expectation capable of defeating lawful eviction. While recognising that eviction must be carried out in accordance with law and with due regard to human dignity, the Court concluded that the authorities were vested with clear legal authority to proceed. Accordingly, the Rule was discharged and the earlier order of stay was vacated.
Key Words:
Right to shelter; Section 5(1), Government and Local Authority Lands and Buildings (Recover of Possession) Ordinance, 1970; Eviction notices on Unauthorized occupation; No legitimate expectation from illegality; Due-process requirement in eviction
Therefore, the right to shelter claimed by the petitioner Nos. 2-4 are coming within the purview of ‘Fundamental Principles’ of State policy, under Part II of the Constitution, not under ‘Fundamental Rights’, described under part III of the Constitution. Law, in this respect, is settled that, the ‘Fundamental Principles’ of the State policy cannot be enforced by this Court under its writ jurisdiction. Hence, we find that this Rule is liable to be discharged on maintainability point alone. … (Para 08)
We are also of the opinion that, no length of unlawful occupation will validate the same, nor will create any legitimate expectation to get immunity from eviction under the Ordinance. Law in this respect is equal for all, slum dwellers or not. … (Para 13)
As such, the decision of the Appellate Division, quoted above, is pertaining to the propriety of summary rejection of a writ petition by the High Court Division. We respectfully endorse the view and, indeed, it is settled law that, when a serious question of law or Constitution would arise in a writ petition that should not be summarily rejected by the High Court Division. This law has been set at rest by the then Supreme Court of Pakistan, when were part of it. … (Para 17)
This should be made clear by this Court that, any eviction to be lawful, must be done and conducted in a lawful manner. Any lawful act, if done in an unlawful manner will violate Article 31 of the Constitution. … (Para 22)
JUDGMENT
Md. Rezaul Hasan, J:
1. This Rule Nisi has been issued calling upon the respondents to show cause as to why the purported issuance of Memo No. D-2/ UBpro-5/ Fa-26/ 420 dated 09.04.2017, issued by respondent No.6 s evidenced by Annexure-A Series, directing the petitioner No. 2-4 and other slum dwellers of Shaymoli Road No. 2 Bosti to vacate their houses situated Shaymoli Kazi Office, Sher-e-Bangla Nagar, Dhaka 1207, in violation of their fundamental rights to equality before law, to be treated in accordance with law and their rights to life and livelihood guaranteed under Article 27, 31 and 32 of the Constitution of Bangladesh, shall not be declared to have been made without lawful authority and to be of no legal effect and further, as to why the attempt to evict the petitioner nos. 2-4 and about 2000 other inhabitants along with 500 houses from the area known as “Shaymoli Road No. 2 Bosti” situated at Road No. 2, Shaymoli Kazi Office, Sher-e-Bangla Nagar, Dhaka 1207, shall not be declared to be without lawful authority, being in violation of their fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 27, 31 and 32 of the Constitution of Bangladesh and/or pass such other or further order or orders as to this Court may seem fit and proper.
2. The facts, relevant for disposal of this Rule, in brief, are that, the petitioner No. 1 is Ain-O-Salish Kendra (ASK), described as a human rights and legal aid organization, registered under the Registration Act, 1860, as well as with the NGO Affairs Bureau. The petitioner Nos. 2 is an inhabitant of the slum namely “Shaymoli Bosti” by occupation bricklayer, the petitioner No. 3 is a house wife, who took shelter in the said Bosti with her family due to river erosion destroying her village and the petitioner No. 4 is a tea-seller. Further case of the petitioners is that, the petitioner Nos. 2-4 along with many others have raised structures and were residing with their families in a piece of land, comprising about 3 / 4 acres, in the said Bosti and that they have no other property to take resort to. It has also been stated that, according to the information gathered by the Petitioner No. 1, some 40% of the male inhabitants of the slum are rickshaw pullers, 10% auto rickshaw drivers, 7% garments worker, 23% day laborers, 2% wood technicians, 1% carpenters, 5% vegetable sellers, 3% night guards, 6% involved in small businesses. Among the women, 65% works in garments sector, 5% day laborers, 2% household workers and the rest are looking after their children and homes. There is no gas supply, minimal sanitation, with many compelled to use polluted well water. Through contributions approved by the government and operated by non-governmental organizations, sanitary latrines have been made available to the majority of the inhabitants, while some minimal waste collection operations are also conducted; that, about 20% of children get access to education through NGO schools and some basic health care facilities particularly for maternal and child health. The further case of the petitioners is that, on 09.04.2017, the respondent No. 6 has issued three notices requiring the petitioner Nos. 2-4 to vacate their premises all under স্মারক নং ডি-২/উবিপ্র-৫/ফা-২৬/৪২০ dated 09.04.2017, within 14.04.2017 and being aggrieved thereby, petitioners have moved this writ petition under Article 102 read with Article 44 of the Constitution and obtained the instant Rule.
3. The respondent No. 2, Bangladesh, represented by the Secretary, Ministry of Industries, has appeared and filed an affidavit-in-opposition, in which it has denied all material allegations made in the writ petition. It has also been stated in the affidavit-in-opposition that, the Rule has become infructuous because none of the petitioners, nor anybody else does stay in the said premises now. It has further been stated that, the office accommodations for NPO and department of Patent Design and Trademark could not be provided due to unlawful occupation of the land allotted to them. It has further been stated that, the Respondent No. 1 has allotted 0.42 acres land, lying at Plot No. F-20A, Agargaon Administrative Area, Sher-E-Bangla Nagar, Dhaka, in favour of the Respondent No. 2 for the construction of the office building with modern facilities for the Respondent Nos. 3 and 4, vide its allotment letter dated 22.09.2008 and that, after completing all legal formalities, on 18.05.2009, the said allotted plots were handed over by the Respondent No. 1, to the Respondent Nos. 3 and 4, vide a transfer Certificate (“Annexure-4”). It has further been stated that, the project for the construction of the office building of the Respondent Nos. 3 and 4 with modern facilities was approved by the Planning Division of the Respondent No. 2 on 29.12.2016 and 22.01.2016 vide its memo No. 36.00.0000.085.031.17-05 (Ka) dated 22.01.2017 (“Annexure-5 and 6”). It has also been stated that, some Government Office of the Respondent No. 1 are running in the rented buildings on payment of a huge rent. Thus the construction building of National Productively Organization and Department of Patents Designs and Trademarks is necessary for saving the public money (Annnexue-15); that, the petitioner Nos. 2 to 4 and other inhabitants are illegally residing upon the allotted land of the Respondent as trespassers; that they have no right, title and interest over the said land. There arises no question of violation of fundamental rights as they are trespassers and that the eviction is lawful as per provisions of section 5(1) of the Government and Local Authority Lands and Buildings (Recovery of Possession) Ordinance, 1970. Hence, the instant Rule has no merit and it is liable to be discharged for ends of justice.
4. Learned Advocate Mr. Md. Anisul Hassan, Mr. Abdullah Al Mahmud, Mr. Mohammad Sayeed Abrar, Mr. Md. Ahsan Ullah, Mr. Hossain Mohammad Shahidul and Mr. Md. Salequzzaman appeared on behalf of the petitioners. They, having placed the petition and the materials on record, first of all submit that, the petitioner No. 1 is an entity registered under the Societies Registration Act as well as with the NGO Bureau of the Government and they have filed this application as PIL. They proceed on that, the petitioner Nos. 2-4 are helpless people dwelling in the slum. They next submit that, these petitioners have filed this writ petition in the form of public interest litigation (PIL) in order to protect their interests along with the interest of other 2000 slum dwellers, who have been directed to vacate their houses situated in the said “Bosti” and that they have no other place to take shelter. They further submit that, there is a government policy to rehabilitate the slum dwellers, but without paying any heed to it, the respondent No. 6 has issued the impugned notices to vacant their houses by 14.04.2017. They also submit that, the petitioners have fundamental right to stay there in as much as their right to life and shelter are protected under the Constitution. They proceed on that, the impugned notices requiring the petitioners to vacate their shelters in the said Bosti are liable to be declared to have been issued without lawful authority and are of no legal effect. In support of their contention they have cited the decision reported in 19 BLD (HCD) (1999) 488: Ain-O-Salish Kendra (ASK) and others Vs. Government of Bangladesh, 21 BLD (HCD) (2001) 446: Kalam and others Vs. Bangladesh and others, and another decision reported in 60 DLR (HCD) (2008) 749: Bangladesh Legal Aid and Services Trust and others Vs. Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh and others. They pray for making the Rule absolute.
5. Learned Additional Attorney General Mr. Mohammad Arshadur Rouf with learned Deputy Attorney Generals Mr. Syed Ejaz Kabir and Mr. Waliul Islam Oli, learned Assistant Attorney Generals Mr. Md. Joynal Hussain, Mr. Md. Abdul Jabbar Joel, Mrs. Mahbuba Tasnim Akhi appeared on behalf of the Respondent No. 2. Learned Additional Attorney General, on the other hand, submits that, these petitioners have been illegally occupying the public property, while there is no particulars, nor any description of other alleged 1500-2000 slum dwellers. Next, referring to the impugned notices, all dated 09.04.2017, requiring the petitioner Nos. 2, 3 and 4 to vacate the premises by 14.04.2017, the learned Additional Attorney General submits that, these notices have been issued under section 5(1) of the Government and Local Authority Lands and Buildings (Recovery of Possession) Ordinance, 1970, and the petitioners have received the notices and they were given minimum 7(seven) days time as permitted by the proviso to the sub-section (1) of section 5 of the Ordinance. He proceeds on that, the law does not make any discrimination between the slum dwellers or any other persons so far as the question of eviction under the aforesaid Ordinance is concerned. He next submits that, there is no evidence supporting that, the petitioners were living in the slum or Bosti for 20 years, however, even if that were true, that does not create any legitimate right or expectation to perpetuate their unlawful occupation. He next submits that, a huge quantity of public properties of the Government are unlawfully occupied by the land gabbers who are getting these low income people sheltered and settled there, to earn rents from these shelters even by unauthorizedly connecting the electricity, gas and water lines. He candidly submits that, there are lots of reports that, some hardened criminals also take shelter in the slums and operate their criminal activities in the City. Referring to the statements made in the affidavit-in-opposition, the learned Additional Attorney General submits that, the land in question has been allotted to the Ministry of Industries (Respondent No. 2) for establishment of the office building with modern facilities for the Respondent No. 3 and 4, vide its allotment letter dated 22.09.2008 and the possession was handed over to them, by the Respondent No. 1, on 18.05.2009 (Annexure-4). But, the government could not construct the buildings, which were very much urgent, particularly to facilitate the development of trade, industries and foreign investment in the country. He has referred to the impugned notices and submits that, in the previous notice dated 03.304.2017, the petitioners were asked for vacating the premises, but they did not, thereby causing serious prejudice to the national interest and have impeded the development program of the Government. He next submits that, the decisions cited by the learned Advocate for the petitioner has no relevance in the facts and circumstances of the present case. He continues that, the premises are now vacant, vide the colored photographs annexed to the supplementary affidavit. He concludes that, this Rule has no merit and the same may kindly be discharged.
6. We have heard the learned Advocates for the petitioners, the learned Additional Attorney General and Deputy Attorney Generals, perused the petition, the supplementary affidavits, affidavit-in-oppositions and other materials on record.
7. In the facts and circumstances of this case, when the right to shelter is sought to be protected under the writ jurisdiction of this Court, we are constraint to consider the Article 15 of the Constitution, that reads as follows:-
“15. It shall be a fundamental responsibility of the State to attain, through planned economic growth, a consistent increase of productive forces and a steady improvement in the material and cultural standard of living of the people, with a view to securing to its citizen-
(a) the provision of the basic necessities of life, including food, clothing, shelter, education and medical care;
(b) ……………..
(c) …………………..
(d) ………………….”. (Emphasis supplied).
8. Therefore, the right to shelter claimed by the petitioner Nos. 2-4 are coming within the purview of ‘Fundamental Principles’ of State policy, under Part II of the Constitution, not under ‘Fundamental Rights’, described under part III of the Constitution. Law, in this respect, is settled that, the ‘Fundamental Principles’ of the State policy cannot be enforced by this Court under its writ jurisdiction. Hence, we find that this Rule is liable to be discharged on maintainability point alone.
9. We have next adverted our attention to the impugned notices and we find that, the petitioners have received these notices, all dated 09.04.2017, issued by the Respondent No. 6, requiring them to vacate the premises occupied by them. The petitioners also did not deny that they were unlawfully occupying the premises in question, which is owned by the Government.
10. It is also not disputed that, the notices issued on 09.04.2017 are all sent as reminders or “তাগিদপত্র”, whereby the petitioner Nos. 2-4 were required to vacate the premises by 14.04.2017. We also find that, in all the notices it has been mentioned that, the petitioners were earlier issued notices dated 28.03.207, requiring them to vacate the premises by 03.04.2017, but they did not.
11. We further find that, the impugned notices have been issued, in the circumstances, pursuant to the provisions of section 5(1) of the Government and Local Authority Lands and Buildings (Recovery of possession) Ordinance, 1970. Section 5(1) of the Ordinance, 1970 reads as follows:-
“5(1) If the Deputy Commissioner, on his own motion or on the complaint of or upon information received from anybody or a Local Authority, is satisfied after making such inquiry as he thinks fit, that a person is an unauthorized occupant, he may issue, in the prescribed manner, a notice directing such person to vacate the land, building or part thereof in his occupation within a period of thirty days from the date of service of the notice.
Provided that, the Deputy Commissioner may, where he is satisfied that thirty days’ notice will not be in public interest, reduce the period of such notice to not less than seven days.”
12. Therefore, we find and hold that, issuance of the aforesaid notices upon the petitioner Nos. 2-4 are permitted by law and the petitioners have been treated in accordance with law and that there was no violation of any fundamental rights of theirs.
13. We are also of the opinion that, no length of unlawful occupation will validate the same, nor will create any legitimate expectation to get immunity from eviction under the Ordinance. Law in this respect is equal for all, slum dwellers or not.
14. Besides, having considered the statements made in the affidavit-in-opposition, we find that, the Respondent No. 1 has allotted the land measuring 0.42 acres of land lying at Plot No. F-20A of Agargaon Administrative Area of Sher-E-Bangla Nagar in favour of the Respondent No. 2 for the construction of the office building with modern facilities for the Respondent Nos. 3 and 4, vide its allotment letter dated 22.09.2008 and that, after completing all legal formalities, on 18.05.2009 said allotted plot was handed over by the Respondent No. 1 to the Respondent Nos. 3 and 4, vide a transfer Certificate (“Annexure-4”).
15. We also find that, the properties in question are most valuable properties situated at the prime location of the capital city, and has been earmarked for very important public offices, who are expending from public exchequer, in the form of rents, for housing their respective offices. Hence, the balance on the issue of public interest should weigh in favour of recovering the public properties and to make it available to the allottees.
16. We have carefully examined the decision, reported in 59 DLR (AD) 176: Rabia Bhuiyan MP Vs. Ministry of LGRD and others, and find that, the Appellate Division has held in that case, that “the High Court Division fell in error in rejecting the writ petition summarily without at all considering the responsibilities of the respondents under the above law and Rules and their inaction. Directions from the Court would provide a necessary catalyst to ensuring due compliance of such bodies with their statutory obligations and policy commitments”. (emphasis added).
17. As such, the decision of the Appellate Division, quoted above, is pertaining to the propriety of summary rejection of a writ petition by the High Court Division. We respectfully endorse the view and, indeed, it is settled law that, when a serious question of law or Constitution would arise in a writ petition that should not be summarily rejected by the High Court Division. This law has been set at rest by the then Supreme Court of Pakistan, when were part of it.
18. We shall not ignore taking judicial notice of the facts that, reportedly in many Bosti in Dhaka City or near the Dhaka City, (namely, Shonpara Bosti), have become safe-shelters or dens for habitual criminals, arms and drug dealers and other serious miscreants. However, for that reason, the agony, safety, security and protection of the helpless or displaced poor people should not be overlooked by the administration. Their actions and scheme should be in consonance with the letters and sprit of Article 15 of the Constitution
19. Hence, the petitioner No. 1, Ain-O-Salish Kendra, should have given authentic and clear identity of the slum dwellers along with all relevant particulars (namely- their occupation, age, gender etc.) in a separate schedule attached to the petitioner (if not to be named as petitioners). If interference under Article 102 is genuinely desired, the petitions should be drafted and presented in proper manner, so that the court can find the relevant facts and circumstances of the case presented before it and can apply its mind for a just and proper decision. A writ petition should not be based on unverified facts or on assumptions.
20. However, the State functionaries cannot disown their responsibility to extend protection to all its citizen including the slum dwellers, so far as their life, properties and dignity are concerned. Particularly, the children, single mothers and elderly people must be treated with dignity as required by Article 11 of the Constitution. No unnecessary pressure or fear should be created in their mind. However, the administration and police shall be strict in dealing with the goons, miscreants and terrorists, disregard of their identity.
21. We have seen many reports saying that, the helpless slum dwellers were not given minimum time to wrap up their small belongies. This will be an instance of doing a lawful act in an unlawful manner.
22. This should be made clear by this Court that, any eviction to be lawful, must be done and conducted in a lawful manner. Any lawful act, if done in an unlawful manner will violate Article 31 of the Constitution.
23. However, in the facts and circumstances of this case, we find clear authority in the respondents to issue the impugned notices and in initiating the eviction process.
24. Before parting of, we should record our discontent for keeping this petition unheard for such a long time.
25. We find no merit in this Rule and the same should be discharged.
26. In the result, the Rule is discharged.
27. The order of stay granted earlier by this Court is hereby vacated.
28. Communicate this judgment and order at once.
A closer reading · editorial inquiry
ain.bd scrutiny
Editorial interpretation and criticism, separate from the source text.
Source scope and editorial separation
This scrutiny is independent commentary by ain.bd. The text field reproduces the supplied seven-page SCOB report, printed pages 171–177. Its Editors’ Note, Key Words and four extracts before the JUDGMENT heading are reporter material, not additional judicial reasons. The court’s reasons begin with paragraph 1 on printed page 172. Pinpoints below use the court’s printed paragraph numbers and the report’s printed page numbers; PDF page 1 corresponds to printed page 171.
The supplied report contains paragraphs 1–28 and no separate opinion, footnotes or substantive table. The two-column appearance on the first page is a caption and appearances layout, transcribed in logical reading order. Annexures, original notices, affidavits, the alleged rehabilitation policy and the complete earlier judgments cited in argument are not appended. Their contents cannot be independently established from this report. Bengali wording omitted by the PDF text layer in paragraphs 2 and 10 has been transcribed from the visible page. No passage has been supplied by conjecture. Printed errors, including 03.304.2017 in paragraph 5 and 28.03.207 in paragraph 10, remain unchanged.
What the court decided, and the narrow rule it supports
ASK and three residents challenged eviction notices affecting the Shyamoli Road No. 2 settlement under Articles 27, 31 and 32. They also invoked a government rehabilitation policy and argued that the residents had nowhere else to live (paragraphs 1–4, pp 172–174). The court treated the shelter claim as falling within Article 15, held that a Part II principle could not itself be enforced through writ jurisdiction, and considered that sufficient to discharge the Rule. It nevertheless examined the notices and upheld them on their merits (paragraphs 7–15, pp 175–176). These are distinct grounds, and an account of the decision should retain both.
The narrow rule is that the shelter claim advanced here did not confer immunity from eviction from admittedly government-owned premises occupied without authority. The court accepted the notices as lawful under section 5(1), rejected a legitimate expectation of immunity arising merely from prolonged unlawful occupation, and recognised that an eviction must also be carried out lawfully (paragraphs 9–13 and 22–23). This reasoning does not establish that an unauthorised occupant loses all constitutional protection or that every notice issued under the Ordinance is valid. Paragraph 22 expressly preserves Article 31 as a limit on the manner of eviction.
The operative orders discharge the Rule, vacate the earlier stay and direct immediate communication of the judgment (paragraphs 25–28, p 177). They contain no order requiring rehabilitation, compensation, a fresh notice or a supervised eviction plan. The ratio should be identified through the direct-enforcement ground and the alternative notice-validity ground, rather than through every statement in the report. The general comments on criminality, pleading schedules and humane treatment in paragraphs 18–21 extend beyond what was necessary to uphold these notices and are better treated as observations or obiter to that extent. Paragraph 22 states an important constitutional qualification, but the court did not apply it to find an unlawful eviction or grant consequential relief.
Interpretation: a sound distinction applied too broadly
Paragraphs 7–8 use a textual and structural approach: shelter appears in Article 15(a), within Part II, rather than among the expressly enforceable rights in Part III. The non-enforcement conclusion accords with the final limb of Article 8(2), although the judgment neither quotes that provision nor identifies a supporting authority at this point. The difficulty is the next step. Article 8(2) also assigns the principles an interpretive function. Refusing direct enforcement of Article 15 does not, by itself, answer a separately pleaded claim under Articles 31 or 32. The judgment needed to explain why the eviction alleged here did not engage those rights, rather than treating the shelter classification as sufficient to dispose of maintainability.
The court’s later reasoning partly supplies the missing distinction. Paragraph 20 invokes dignity under Article 11, and paragraph 22 treats unlawful execution of an otherwise lawful eviction as an Article 31 violation. Article 11 also belongs to Part II. Its use need not contradict paragraph 8 if it guides the interpretation of an enforceable protection instead of creating a freestanding remedy. That is a possible reconciliation of the reasons, not an interpretive method expressly worked through by the bench. The judgment would have been stronger had it explained that relationship and addressed the pleaded Article 32 claim on its own terms.
Paragraph 15 gives public offices, rental expenditure and the productive use of public land decisive weight. This is a purposive public-interest justification for recovery. It does not establish that every procedural step complied with the Ordinance. The purpose of recovering land and the legality of the chosen procedure require separate answers.
The unresolved notice-period problem
Section 5(1), reproduced in paragraph 11, ordinarily provides thirty days from service. Its proviso permits reduction to no fewer than seven days where the Deputy Commissioner is satisfied that thirty days’ notice would not be in the public interest. Paragraph 10 describes the challenged notices of 09.04.2017, requiring vacation by 14.04.2017, as reminders of earlier notices. That later interval is five elapsed days. The earlier dates are printed as 28.03.207 and 03.04.2017. The defective year cannot be silently corrected. Even if 2017 was intended, 28 March to 3 April represents six elapsed days. The judgment gives no service dates or explanation of the applicable counting method.
The strongest defence is that a reminder need not start a fresh statutory period: an earlier valid notice may already have afforded the required opportunity to leave. Paragraph 10 plainly relies on the earlier notices, and paragraph 5 records counsel’s assertion that the minimum period was given. But the report does not identify the earlier service dates or demonstrate the earlier notices’ validity. Nor does it explain whether the public-interest satisfaction required for shortening the period existed when those notices were issued. The court’s own assessment of the value of the land in paragraph 15 does not, without explanation, prove the notice-maker’s statutory satisfaction. These omissions undermine the reasoning supporting compliance; they do not permit a definitive finding that the unproduced notices were invalid.
The strongest case for the result, and the answer it still requires
The State’s strongest argument is substantial. Paragraph 9 records that the petitioners did not deny unauthorised occupation of government property. Paragraph 14 identifies a prior allotment and transfer for public offices. Paragraph 15 explains the continuing rental burden on public funds. Courts must take those interests seriously. A claim based solely on need and length of occupation cannot simply displace statutory recovery powers or convert Article 15 into an unconditional entitlement to remain on this particular site.
Yet ownership does not decide procedure. A resident can lack a right to stay indefinitely and still possess a right to a lawful notice and lawful execution. A limited remedy addressing a proven procedural defect would not necessarily confer title or permanent possession. Paragraph 13 is therefore strongest when confined to an expectation of immunity based only on prolonged unlawful occupation. It should not be extended to reject every expectation arising from a distinct promise, policy or lawful governmental representation. Paragraph 4 records a rehabilitation-policy submission, but the judgment does not identify the policy’s text, conditions or applicability. On the supplied material, neither an enforceable rehabilitation promise nor its categorical legal irrelevance can be established.
Earlier authorities receive an incomplete answer
Paragraph 4 lists three earlier High Court decisions: ASK, 19 BLD (HCD) (1999) 488; Kalam, 21 BLD (HCD) (2001) 446; and BLAST, 60 DLR (HCD) (2008) 749. Paragraph 5 records the State’s submission that those cases were irrelevant, but the court does not separately identify their holdings or explain the material factual differences. Recording counsel’s objection is not a judicial distinction. This limits the judgment’s usefulness to a reader trying to reconcile it with the earlier eviction cases.
Paragraphs 16–17 do address Rabia Bhuiyan MP v Ministry of LGRD and others, 59 DLR (AD) 176. The court treats it as authority against summary rejection where a serious legal or constitutional question arises. That procedural distinction has force because the present Rule was heard on its merits. Still, the passage reproduced in paragraph 16 also refers to statutory obligations and policy commitments. The judgment does not explain whether any comparable obligation existed here. The complete earlier decision has not been supplied, so this scrutiny does not attribute a wider holding to it or claim that the present judgment contradicts it.
Evidence, public-interest litigation and the criminality observations
Paragraph 19 reasonably calls for reliable facts and identification sufficient to support relief. That matters where a petition seeks protection for a large group whose circumstances may differ. But the report identifies three individual residents and describes their circumstances in paragraph 2. The court does not explain why missing particulars for the wider group defeated, or materially weakened, those individuals’ claims. Its suggested schedule should not be presented as a universal rule that every affected person must be named before any public-interest challenge can proceed.
Paragraph 18 takes judicial notice of reports about criminal activity in other settlements, naming Shonpara Bosti. It identifies no report or evidence connecting these petitioners to those activities. Such generalisations add no necessary step to the statutory recovery analysis and risk letting association replace proof. There is also an evidential tension: paragraph 19 demands verified facts from the petitioners, while paragraph 18 relies on unspecified reports. The paragraph’s accompanying insistence on protecting displaced poor people mitigates its language but does not supply the missing connection to this case.
Lawful execution, unresolved facts and delay
Paragraphs 20–22 are the judgment’s clearest safeguard. They reject unnecessary fear, require dignity for vulnerable residents and recognise that denying people time to collect their belongings can make an otherwise authorised eviction unlawful. However, the court does not specify a practical timetable or mechanism to enforce those protections. Paragraph 21 refers to reports of such conduct generally; it should not be described as a finding that these respondents committed it against these petitioners.
The respondents alleged that the premises were already empty and the Rule had become infructuous (paragraphs 3 and 5). The court does not expressly resolve that contention or establish when, how or why the residents left. Vacating the stay in paragraph 27 does not prove that an eviction subsequently occurred. Paragraph 24 criticises the long wait for a hearing. The petition number and decision date place the proceedings across 2017–2025, but the report does not establish who caused the delay or what happened to the residents during it. The procedural history leaves those practical consequences unanswered.
Precedential limits
This is a High Court Division decision, not an Appellate Division ruling. Article 111 makes Appellate Division law binding on the High Court Division and law declared by either division binding on subordinate courts. The decision should be cited with that hierarchy in view. Its discussion of other High Court cases does not establish that they were overruled, and its brief treatment of Rabia Bhuiyan cannot enlarge or displace the Appellate Division’s actual holding.
The strongest precedent is the distinction between an unsupported claim to remain on public land and the continuing obligation to conduct recovery lawfully. Its application is narrower than a general denial of housing-related constitutional claims: the court relied on admitted unauthorised occupation, the particular notices and a specified public use. It did not determine private-land eviction, a proven rehabilitation entitlement, a disputed title or the legality of a particular completed operation. No appeal, stay after judgment or later treatment is established by the supplied report.
References & source notes
Ain-O-Salish Kendra (ASK) and others v Bangladesh and others, Writ Petition No. 5608 of 2017 (High Court Division, 8 July 2025), 20 SCOB [2025] HCD 171, printed pp 171–177 (supplied seven-page report). Public PDF URL supplied for this post: https://ain.bd/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/Ain-O-Salish-Kendra-ASK-and-others-v-Bangladesh-and-others.pdf
Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Article 8(2), including the interpretive role and non-enforceability of Part II. Official text: https://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/act-print-367/section-print-24556.html
Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Articles 11 and 15(a), Part II. Article 15 is reproduced in part at paragraph 7 of the judgment; Article 11 is invoked at paragraph 20. Official Part II text: https://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/act-367/act-part-print-199.html
Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Articles 27, 31 and 32, Part III. Official text: https://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/act-367/part-details-200.html?lang=en
Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Articles 44 and 102, invoked in paragraph 2 of the judgment. Official consolidated text: https://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/act-print-367.html
Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Article 111, binding effect of Supreme Court judgments. Official text: https://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/act-367/section-24668.html
Government and Local Authority Lands and Buildings (Recovery of Possession) Ordinance, 1970 (East Pakistan Ordinance No. XXIV of 1970), section 5(1) and proviso. Official text: https://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/act-print-363.html. The judgment’s own quotation, including its spelling and punctuation, is preserved separately in the text field.
Rabia Bhuiyan MP v Ministry of LGRD and others, 59 DLR (AD) 176: identified and quoted in paragraph 16; discussed in paragraph 17, printed p 176. This reference records the citation and passage in the supplied judgment; it does not represent independent examination of the full earlier judgment.
Earlier High Court authorities cited by petitioners at paragraph 4, printed p 174: Ain-O-Salish Kendra (ASK) and others v Government of Bangladesh, 19 BLD (HCD) (1999) 488; Kalam and others v Bangladesh and others, 21 BLD (HCD) (2001) 446; Bangladesh Legal Aid and Services Trust and others v Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh and others, 60 DLR (HCD) (2008) 749. These citations are reproduced as reported in the supplied judgment; their full texts were not supplied or independently examined.
About the contributor
Md. Ibrahim Khalilullah
Editor-in-Chief